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Executive Summary
On Aug. 8, 2005, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(PL 109-58). This was the first major piece of energy legislation enacted
since 1992 following five years of Congressional efforts to pass energy
legislation. Among other things, the law contains tax incentives worth
over $14 billion between 2005 and 2015. These incentives representboth
pre-existing initiatives that the law extends as well as new initiatives.
In this paper I survey federal tax energy policy focusing both on
programs that affect energy supply and demand. I brieflydiscuss the
distributional and incentive impacts of many of these incentives. In par-
ticular, I make a rough calculation of the impact of tax incentives for
domestic oil production on world oil supply and prices and find that
the incentives for domestic production have negligible impact on world
supply or prices despite the United States being the third largest oil
producing country in the world.
Finally, I present results from a model of electricity pricing to assess
the impact of the federal tax incentives directed at electricity genera-
tion. I find that nuclear power and renewable electricity sources ben-
efit substantially from accelerated depreciation and that the production
and investment tax credits make clean coal technologies cost competi-
tive with pulverized coal and wind and biomass cost competitive with
natural gas.
1.Introduction
On Aug. 8, 2005, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(FL 109-58). This was the first major piece of energy legislation since
1992 and culminated five years of efforts to pass energy legislation by146 Metcalf
the Bush Administration. Among other things, the law contains tax
incentives worth over $14 billion between 2005 and 2015. These incen-
tives represent both pre-existing initiatives that the law extends as well
as new initiatives. In this paper I review federal tax energy policy focus-
ing both on programs that affect energy supply and demand.
In the next section, I discuss an economic rationale for energy tax
incentives. Next, I review current energy taxes in the third section. In
the following section, I summarize the various energy incentives in
the tax code.' These include accelerated depreciation of various types
as well as production and investment tax credits. In addition, special
incentives are targeted towards electric utilities and the transportation
sector. In the fifth section, I briefly discuss the distributional and incen-
tive impacts of many of these tax incentives. I also conduct a levelized
cost analysis of various electricity generation technologies to assess the
impact of the production and investment tax incentives directed at elec-
tricity generation.
In summary, the energy taxes or tax incentives currently in effect are
difficult to justify on the basis of economic theory. Energy taxes totaled
$36.1 billion in fiscal year 2004 with the vast bulk of the revenues com-
ing from motor vehicle fuel taxes. The most pressing case for taxation-
externalitiessuggests direct pollution or driving charges rather than
a gasoline tax. The other motor vehicle related tax, the Gas Guzzler
Tax, suffers from the defect of excluding light trucks and Sport Util-
ity Vehicles (SUVs) from the tax. These make up the majority of motor
vehicles currently sold.
With the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT), energy
tax preferences are worth roughly $6.7 billion in fiscal year 2006. The
production and investment tax credits have been effective at making
certain renewable energy sources (mainly wind and biomass) competi-
tive with natural gas in electricity generation. I note, however, that tax
credits are a socially costly way of making these renewable sources
competitive with fossil fuel sources.
Finally, while fossil fuel and nuclear power continue to receive the
majority of benefits from tax incentives, the tilt towards these fuels
is not as large as it once was. Percentage depletion and expensing of
intangible drilling costs, for example, have been scaled back relative
to the situation in the 1950s and 1960s. And the investment tax credits
for solar generated electricity combined with generous depreciation tax
treatment contribute to negative effective tax rates on solar generated
electricity.Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 147
2.Rationale for Government Energy Tax Incentives
Why should the federal government have an energy policy? More par-
ticularly, why should the tax code be used as an instrument of an energy
policy? To help evaluate the various provisions of the tax code that affect
energy supply and demand, I briefly review four major arguments
for government intervention in energy markets: energy externalities,
national security, market failures and barriers in energy conservation
markets, and rent expropriation. For a more in-depth review, see New-
bery (2005) or Lazzari (2005).
A broad array of externalities are associated with our consumption of
energy. Burning fossil fuels contributes to air pollution(sulfur dioxides,
nitrogen oxides, particulates) and generates greenhouse gases. In addi-
tion, our use of petroleum in transportation contributes to roadway
congestion, accident externalities, and other traffic related market fail-
ures (see Parry and Small 2005 for a fuller discussionof driving related
externalities). Economic theory suggests that we should tax externali-
ties directly rather than a proxy for the externality (here, motor vehicle
fuels). Road congestion suggests the use of congestion or time-of-day
pricing on highways. Tailpipe emissions from vehicles call for emis-
sions pricing if technologically feasible.2 Accident externalities call for
changes in automobile insurance pricing. None of these externalities
suggest a policy of taxing motor vehicle fuels directly. The one external-
ity that might suggest a motor fuels tax is global warming arising from
burning fossil fuels given the tight relationship between petroleum
consumed and carbon emitted.3 But even here a stronger case could
be made for a comprehensive tax on the carbon content of all energy
sources rather than a specific tax on motor vehicle fuels.4
Positive spill-overs from research and development are frequently
cited as an argument for tax incentives for particular technologies.
Supporters of production tax credits for renewable fuels, for example,
argue that experience in the marketplace and learningby doing will
bring about cost savings that support the initial subsidies. The diffi-
culty with such an argument, of course, is that all research and develop-
ment spending has elements of non-appropriability leading to a policy
prescription of support for general R&D rather than sector or technol-
ogy specific R&D support.
A second broad rationale for government intervention in energy
markets is national security concerns. Here the argument is that our
dependence on imported energy, oil in particular, makes us vuinerable148 Metcalf
to economic coercion from foreign owners of energy resources. In 2004,
the United States imported over 60 percent of the 20.5 miffion barrels
per day of petroleum that it consumed (Energy Information Admiriis-
tration 2005). The need to protect a stable source of energy imports, it is
argued, requires increased spending on defense and national security
and has made the country more vulnerable to unstable governments in
the Middle East and other oil rich regions. Oil import tariffs are a pro-
posed solution to this problem. By reducing our dependence on foreign
oil, it is argued, the United States reduces its vulnerability to political
and economic instability elsewhere. The difficulty with this argument
is that oil is a commodity priced on world markets. Even if the United
States were to produce all the oil it consumes, it would still be vulner-
able to oil price fluctuations. A supply reduction in the Middle East
would raise prices of domestic oil just as readily as it raises prices of
imported oil.5
A third argument for government intervention in energy markets is
the existence of market barriers to energy efficient capital investment. A
long-standing "energy paradox" claims that consumers need very high
rates of return on energy efficient capital (appliances, housing improve-
ments, lighting, etc.) and a variety of market barriers have been pro-
posed to explain this paradox and to motivate market interventions.
I critique the market barriers literature elsewhere (Metcalf 2006) and
simply note two relevant issues here that support possible market inter-
ventions. First, many have argued that consumers are poorly informed
about the potential for energy savings (as well as the value of the sav-
ings) associated with newmore expensive technologies. This is a rea-
sonable point given the public good nature of information acquisition
and suggests the value of government information programs. Programs
such as energy efficiency labeling on new appliances can help overcome
information failures at low cost. Second, principal-agent problems may
deter energy efficient investments. A good example is the provision of
energy efficient appliances and housing in rental housing. Tenants may
desire more energy efficient housing and appliances but landlords may
be reluctant to make the investments out of concern that they may be
unable to recoup their incremental investment through higher rents. In
addition, many apartment buildings are not easily converted to allow
for tenant control over and payment for energy consumption (espe-
cially heating services) in individual units. This removes incentives for
tenants to conserve energy. Landlords, meanwhile, may be reluctant to
invest in energy conservation capital if the effectiveness of the invest-Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 149
ment depends on tenant use characteristics (installing additional insu-
lation is likely not cost-effective if tenants open windows during the
winter when apartments become overheated). The appropriate policy
response in this situation is to provide a subsidy to tenants (or land-
lords) for investments in energy conservation capital.
Finally, a number of authors (Newbery 1976; Bergstrom 1982; Karp
and Newbery 1991) have noted that an oil import tariff can expropriate
some portion of the Hotelling rents associated with oil. The intuition is
straightforward if all consuming countries could act in collusion. Since
potential oil supply from known oil fields is fixed, a tax that doesn't
alter the relative scarcity rents of oil over time wifi not affect the time
proffle of extraction. Thus, we can collapse the analysis to that of a tax
on an inelastically supplied product. Since the entire burden of such a
tax is on the supplier, the result follows.6 Newbery (2005) estimates that
the optimal oil import tariff for the EU and the United States ranges
between $3.10 and $15.60 per barrel in 2002.
Summing up, we shall see that the arguments for using the tax code
to affect energy supply and demand are poorly related to existing
energy tax policy. The most compelling case can be made for energy
taxes related to carbon emissions and for an oil import fee to transfer
some of the Hotelling rents from oil suppliers to the United States. I
turn next to a discussion of current energy tax provisions at the federal
level.
3.Federal Energy Taxes
Table 5.1 lists federal taxes that are specifically linked to energy produc-
tion or consumption. By far the largest are the excise taxes on gasoline
and diesel fuels that are dedicated to the Highway Trust Fund account-
ing for over 95 percent of federal energy excise tax collections in FY
2004. The federal excise tax rate on gasoline is 18.4q per gallon. Of that,
0.lq is dedicated to the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund
and the remaining 18.3 to the Highway Trust Fund.7 Of that 18.3 per
gallon, 2.86t is dedicated to the Mass Transit Account and the remain-
ing 15.44q to the Highway Account. In fiscal year 2004, this tax raised
$35.1 biffion. In comparison, total outlays for grants to state and local
governments from the highway and urban mass transit programs in fis-
cal year 2004 were $30.0 billion.. Non-trust fund aid to sub-federal gov-
ernments for highways and urban mass transit totaled an additional
$7.8 billion with nearly all of that designated to urban mass transit.150 Metcalf
Table 5.1
Federal Energy Excise Taxes
Highway trust fund revenues
Gas guzzler tax




Aquatic resources trust fund
tax on motorboat gasoline
and other fuels
Inland waterway fuels tax
Total $36,114
*Diesel fuel is taxed at the federal level at 24.3 per gallon. State excise taxes on gaso-
line and diesel fuel averaged 18.lri as of April 2006. According to the American Petro-
leum Institute (2006), taking into account all taxes on gasoline (diesel) including the
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Tax, the average tax rate is 46.5f (53.02) per gallon.
Source: Budget of the United States, Historic Tables, Table 2.4. Gas Guzzler tax revenue
from SOT Historic Tables, Table 21.
Because the federal motor fuels gas tax is an excise tax, its ad valorem
equivalent rate fluctuates with gas prices. Figure 5.1 shows how the
rate has changed between 1978 and 2005. With the decline of gasoline
prices in the late 1980s, the tax peaked at 27 percent of the refiner price
of finished motor gasoline to end users in 1998 and has fallen since then
to 10 percent in 2005.
The United States has the lowest tax rate on unleaded gasoline
among all the OECD countries (see figure 5.2). Its tax rate per litre
($.104) in the fourth quarter of 2005 was less than half that of the
next closest country and compares to an OECD average rate of $.789
per litre. Returning to the importance of motor fuels taxes in total
energy tax collections, consider the United Kingdom. Its tax on gaso-
line is the third highest among OECD countries (see figure 5.2). Yet the
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Sources: ETA Monthly Energy Review and Jackson (2006).
The Gas Guzzler Tax was enacted as part of the Energy Tax Act of
1978. It levies a tax on automobiles that obtain fuel mileage below 22.5
miles per gallon.9 Tax rates range from $1,000 to $7,700 per vehicle.
In 2004 the tax collected $141 million. The gas guzzler tax explicitly
excludes sport utility vehicles, minivans, and pickup trucks, which rep-
resent 54 percent of the new vehicle sales in 2004 (U.S. Census Bureau
2006, table 1027). The light truck category (comprising SUVs, minivans,
and pickup trucks) is the fastest growing segment of the new vehicle
market, growing at an annual rate of 5.5 percent between 1990 and
2004. In contrast, new car sales are falling at an annual rate of 1.6 per-
cent. Unofficial Congressional estimates suggest that phasing out the
SUV loophole over four years would raise roughly $700 million annu-
ally once the phase-out was complete.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) resurrected the Oil Spill Lia-
bility Trust Fund tax at the original rate of 5 per barrel. This tax had
151
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previously been in effect from 1990 through 1994. The Joint Committee
on Taxation estimates that this tax will raise $1.25 biffion between 2005
and 2010. The tax is imposed on crude oil received at U.S. refineries as
well as imported petroleum products. Domestic crude oil for export is
also subject to the tax if the tax had not been previously paid.
The coal excise tax funds the Black Lung Disability Fund. It is levied
on coal mined in the United States at a rate of 4.4 percent of the sales
price up to a limit of $1.10 per ton of underground coal and $.55 per ton
of surface mined coal. This tax raised $566 million in 2004.
Gasoline sold for sport motorboats is taxed at the same rate as high-
way gasoline and diesel fuel and the funds allocated to the Aquatic
Resources Trust Fund (subject to an annual cap on transfers that effec-
tively reduces the share of tax on motorboat fuels shifted to this trust
fund). Finally the Inland Waterways Fuels Tax levies a tax of 22.4 per
gallon of fuel sold to commercial vessels using the Irdand Waterway
System (barges for the most part).
4.Energy Incentives in the Corporate and Personal Income Tax
The President's FY2007 Budget Submission lists over $20 billion of tax
expenditures (for the fiscal years 2007-2011) associated with energy.'°
Table 5.2 lists these tax expenditures sorted from highest to lowest cost
(over the five year budget window). Both the number of tax provisions
and the revenue cost have increased as a result of 2005's energy legisla-
tion. The General Accounting Office (2005) listed nine income tax pref-
erences totaling $4.2 billion in revenue loss in fiscal year 2003.11 In fiscal
year 2006, the Administration's budget lists 29 preferences totaling $6.7
billion for that year.
The single largest tax expenditure is associated with alcohol fuels.
Most of this revenue loss arises from the reduction in motor vehicle
fuel tax revenues ($12,500 million) with the remainder arising from the
$.51 per gallon income tax credit for this fuel.12 After alcohol fuels is
the tax expenditure for investment and production tax credits for new
energy technologies. Investment tax credits range from 20 to 30 percent
depending on the technology and production tax credits exist, primar-
ily for electricity produced from renewable energy sources.
Before turning to a discussion of the current code, it may be use-
ful to provide some historical perspective on the federal tax treatment
of energy.'3 Prior to the first oil embargo in 1973 the federal govern-
ment's tax policy was designed to encourage fossil fuel exploration and154 Metcalf
Table 5.2
Energy Tax Expenditures
Alcohol fuel credits 12,730
New technology credit (secs. 45 & 48) 4,060
Alternative fuel production credit (sec. 29) 3,450
Expensing of exploration and development costs 3,230
Excess of percentage over cost depletion 3,230
Temporary 50% expensing for equipment used in the refining of 830
liquid fuels
Credit for investment in clean coal facilities 780
Amortize all geological and geophysical expenditures over 2 years 630
Natural gas distribution pipelines treated as 15year property 560
Credit for energy efficiency improvements to existing homes 530
Exclusion of interest on energy facility bonds 510
Tax credit and deduction for clean-fuel burning vehicles 420
Capital gains treatment of royalties on coal 400
Exclusion of utility conservation subsidies 380
Allowance of deduction for certain energy efficient commercial 340
building property
Exception from passive loss limitation for working interests in oil and 200
gas properties
Credit for holding clean renewable energy bonds 180
Credit for business installation of qualified fuel cells and stationary 150
microturbine power plants
Credit for energy efficient appliances 80
Credit for construction of new energy efficient homes 40
Enhanced oil recovery credit 20
30% credit for residential purchases/installations of solar and fuel 20
cells
Pass through low sulfur diesel expensing to cooperative owners 30
Deferral of gain from dispositions of transmission property to 210
implement FERC restructuring policy
Credit for production from advanced nuclear power facilities
Alternative fuel and fuel mixture tax credit
Source: FY2007 Budget Submission of the President, Analytical Perspectives.
Revenue Cost:
FY 2007-2011
Tax Provision ($millions)Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 155
production. Expensing of intangible drilling costs was introduced in
1916 and percentage depletion in 1926. Percentage depletion for oil and
gas was particularly generous with a rate of 27.5 percent(relative to the
current rate of 15 percent) for oil and gas and was available to all com-
panies, not simply independent producers as at present.
During the 1970s the sharp increase in the price of oil combined with
growing environmental concerns associated with oil and gas driffing
as well as a rising federal budget deficit led to a curtailment of the
preferential treatment for fossil fuels. The percentage depletion rate,
for example, was reduced to 15 percent for oil and gas and restricted
to independent producers (i.e., producers without refining or retailing
operations). The Energy Tax Act of 1978 introduced the Gas Guzzler
Tax, tax subsidies for gasohol, and investment tax credits for conserva-
tion and renewable energy production. This was followed by the Wind-
fall Profits Tax which, in addition to its efforts to tax profits on old oil,
enacted the section 29 production tax credits for non-conventional oil.
The election of Ronild Reagan in 1980 ushered in a new era in the fed-
eral government's tax treatment of energy. According to Lazzari (2006),
Reagan brought a free-market approach to energy policy. As such, he
worked to eliminate the Windfall Profits Tax (largely repealed in 1988)
and to end federal tax credits for energy production or investment. By
1988 all that remained of the federal tax credits for energy were the sec-
tion 48 investment tax credits for solar and geothermal power.
The post-Reagan era saw a number of changes to the tax code with
the most significant being the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (PL 102-486).
This law enacted the section 45 production tax credits for wind and
closed loop biomass generated electricity. As discussed below, this
credit was gradually expanded to cover other renewable sources and
remains in effect today.'4 Other laws passed during the post-Reagan era
generally extended existing production and investment tax credits and
raised the gasoline tax.'5
The most recent change is the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which
extended and expanded coverage of the section 45 production and sec-
tion 48 investment tax credits among a variety of other provisions. I
discuss the current tax code's various provisions in the next section.'6
4.1Depreciation
Depreciation is the wearing out of an asset over time and is properly
recognized as a cost of doing business. Economic depreciation refers to
the actual wearing out of the asset as reflected in changes in the asset's156 Metcalf
value over time. A pure income tax would allow a deduction for eco-
nomic depreciation. Because of the difficulties involved in measuring
economic depreciation, the tax code groups assets into broad catego-
ries and mandates depreciation schedules for assets in each category
Tax depreciation may bear some resemblance to economic deprecia-
tion but it should be stressed that tax depreciation is a policy tool that
may be used to encourage or discourage certain types of investment at
the expense of other types. Accelerated depreciation refers to a depre-
ciation schedule that allows for more rapid tax depreciation than eco-
nomic depreciation. The limit of accelerated depreciation is expensing,
an immediate deduction for the entire cost of the asset.
Expensing an asset reduces the effective tax rate on this asset to zero.
To see this consider an asset worth $100 that generates additional net
profits of $20 per year. In the absence of taxation, this asset produces a
net return of 20 percent. Now impose a 35 percent tax with expensing.
In the first year, the firm takes a deduction for the cost of the machine
and enjoys a reduction in taxes of $35 (35 percent times $100). The after-
tax cost of the machine has been reduced to $65. In subsequent years,
the firm obtains additional after-tax profits of $13. The net return on
this investment is still 20 percent ($13/$65).
Under the current tax code, capital assets are depreciated accord-
ing to the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) with
recovery periods ranging from 3 to 39 years under the General Depre-
ciation System (GDS).'7 Most capital is depreciated using a declining
balance method at either 200 percent (3, 5, 7, and 10 year property) or
150 percent (15 and 20 year property). Table 5.3 shows the recovery
period for various types of energy related capital. Most electric gen-
erating capital is depreciated over 20 years with the major exception
being nuclear power plants (15 years) and renewable energy generating
capital (five years). High voltage electricity transmission lines received
a 15 year recovery period in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. That act
also clarified the depreciation of natural gas gathering pipelines (seven
years) and reduced the recovery period of distribution pipelines from
20 to 15 years. In addition, the new law also contains a provision allow-
ing partial expensing for new refinery capacity placed in service before
2012. The provision allows for 50 percent expensing with the remainder
deducted as under current law.
Below, I provide some analysis of the impact of accelerated deprecia-
tion (as well as other tax provisions) on the cost of capital for various
types of electricity generating property and show that nuclear powerFederal Tax Policy towards Energy 157
Table 5.3
Recovery Periods for Energy Capital
Electric utility generation and distribution property 20
Electric transmission property (below 69 kV) 20
69 kV and higher electric transmission property 15
Electric utility nuclear power generator 15
Industrial electric generation 15
Liquefied natural gas plant 15
Natural gas distribution pipelines 15
Pipeline transportation (including storage of integrated producers) 15
Coal gasification production property 10
Refineries 10
Natural gas gathering pipelines 7
Natural gas production property 7
Electric utility nuclear fuel assemblies 5
Oil and gas drilling rigs 5
Section 48 alternative energy property 5
Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service (2006).
and electricity generated from renewable sources receive particularly
generous tax treatment from accelerated depreciation.
Oil drilling receives an additional depreciation benefit from the abil-
ity to expense dry holes. One can view dry holes as part of the cost of
drilling a successful well. This tax provision raises the effective value
of the depreciation deductions for oil rigs. Technology, however, has
reduced the percentage of dry holes. In 1960, 40 percent of all wells
drilled were dry holes. By 2004, that percentage had fallen to 12 percent
reducing the tax advantage of dry hole expensing.18
While not energy capital explicitly, motor vehicles have a signifi-
cant impact on energy consumption and depreciation rules treat dif-
ferent types of motor vehicles very differently. Clean fuel vehicles
may be expensed up to limits (ranging from $50,000 for trucks or vans
with gross vehicle weight exceeding 26,000 pounds to $2,000 for
motor vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds). Clean fuel vehicles
include vehicles that burn natural gas, LNG, LPG, hydrogen, electric-




Passenger cars, SUVs and pickup trucks used in a small business can
have very different depreciation treatment. Small businesses are allowed
a section 179 deduction of up to $100,000 per year in capital expenses
(subject to phase-out rules). The section 179 deduction is limited for
motor vehicles in certain ways. First, passenger vehicles and light trucks
with a gross vehicle weight of 6,000 pounds or less are treated as listed
property and subject to annual depreciation deduction limits arising
from luxury passenger car rules written in the Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984 (PL 98-369). These vehicles must be depreciated over a five
year period with specified annual depreciation caps.'9 The luxury
vehicle limits are such that any passenger car costing more than
$13,860 and any light truck costing more than $15,360 wifi have a
recovery period longer than the standard five year recovery period for
motor vehicles. Second, small businesses purchasing SUVs weighing
more than 6,000 pounds (but not more than 14,000 pounds) can expense
$25,000 and depreciate the balance over five years using double-declin-
ing balance rules. Table 5.4 illustrates how the various depreciation
rules affect the after-tax price for a small business owner in the top per-
sonal income tax bracket choosing among three new 2005 vehicles each
costing $30,000. The passenger car must be written off over 21 years as
opposed to 19 years for the light SLTV and six years for the heavy SUV.
The differences in depreciation treatment raise the price of the passen-
ger car and light SLJV by 13 and 10 percent respectively relative to the
heavy SUV
4.2Tax Treatment Specific to Fossil Fuel Production
Traditionally, fossil fuels have received preferential tax treatment. Per-
centage depletion and the expensing of intangible drilling costs are the
Table 5.4
Depreciation Treatment for Motor Vehicles
Curb weight reported for Toyota Avalon. Table assumes purchase price of $30,000 for all
vehicles, tax rate of 35 percent and a discount rate of 10 percent.
Toyota Avalon Ford Escape Ford Expedition
Gross vehicle weight rating 3,490 5,520 7,300
Years to depreciate 21 19 6
PV of tax shield 6,632 7,135 9,308
After-tax vehicle cost 23,368 22,865 20,692
Percentage mark-up over
heavy SUV
13% 10%Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 159
most well known. While not as generously treated as in the past, the tax
preferences for fossil fuel production are still important.
As natural resources are extracted from booked reserves, the value of
those reserves is diminished. This is a legitimate cost of business and
a Haig-Simons income tax would allow a deduction for the value of
the resource extracted. Rather than take deductions for the value of the
extracted resource, oil, gas, and coal producers have historically been
allowed a deduction based on percentage depletion. Percentage deple-
tion allows the firm to deduct a fraction of the revenue arising from sale
of the resource. Historic percentage depletion rates have been as high
as 27.5 percent. Currently percentage depletion is allowed for indepen-
dent producers at a 15 percent rate for oil and gas and 10 percent for
coal.2° Percentage depletion is allowed on production up to 1,000 barrels
of average daily production of oil (or its equivalent for natural gas). In
addition, the depletion allowance cannot exceed 100 percent of taxable
income from the property (50 percent for coal) and 65 percent of taxable
income from all sources.21 Despite the curtailed availability of percent-
age depletion, it continues to be a significant energy tax expenditure,
costing $3.2 billion over five years in the federal budget (see table 5.2).
The following example illustrates the tax benefits of percentage deple-
tion ovei cost depletion. John Doe purchases an interest in a property
for $300,000 that contains reserves of 50,000 barrels of oil. He produces
10,000 barrels of oil in the first year which he sells for $630,000. Under




Percentage depletion allows him to deduct $94,500 (.15 x $630,000).
Note that percentage depletion can exceed the basis in the asset. Con-
tinuing to assume a first purchase price of $63 per barrel, the total value
of oil extracted would be $3.15 million and the percentage depletion
deduction would be $472,500.22 Obviously the benefit of percentage
depletion would be considerably higher at the historic depletion rate
of 27.5 percent.
The second major tax benefit available to oil and gas producers is
the ability to expense intangible drilling expenses (labor and material
costs associated with drilling wells). Normally the non-capital expenses
associated with oil exploration and drilling would be capitalized and
the costs allocated as income is earned from the well over its useful160 Metcalf
life. Instead firms may deduct these expenses in the first year. Corpora-
tions may only deduct 70 percent of the costs and must depreciate the
remaining 30 percent over five years. Additionally, geological and geo-
physical costs associated with exploration can be amortized over a two
year period.23 As noted in table 5.2, this is the third largest energy tax
expenditure in the federal budget totaling $3.2 billion over five years.
In addition to the tax preferences described above, I note two addi-
tional significant tax preferences. First, owners of coal mining rights
who lease their land for mining receive royalties for coal extracted from
their property. Owners who are individuals may elect to treat those
royalty payments as capital income in lieu of taking percentage deple-
tion on the property Second, owners of working interests in oil and gas
properties are exempt from passive loss limitations for income from
these properties.
4.3Production and Investment Tax Credits
The federal tax code includes a number of production and investment
tax credits on fossil, alternative, nuclear, and renewable fuels. Those
credits include the following:
1.Section 29 Non-Conventional Oil Production Credit24
The 1980 Windfall Profits Tax (PL 96-223) was a failed effort to simul-
taneously capture profits on old oil as a result of oil price increases in
the 1970s and encourage exploration for and production of new oil.
The law was repealed in 1988.25 One part of that law that was retained
was the section 29 Alternative Fuel Production Credit for production
of non-conventional oil (e.g., shale oil, synthetic fuel oils from coal).
The section provides for a $3.00 per barrel of oil-equivalent produc-
tion tax credit (indexed in 1979 dollars and worth $6.79 in 2005). The
2005 energy act adds coke and coke gas to the list of qualified fuels and
makes the credit part of the general business credit.26 The credit phases
out for oil prices above $23.50 in 1979 dollars ($53.20 in 2005).27
The tax expenditure for this credit is estimated to be $3.4 billion
between FY 2007 and 2011 and is the second largest energy tax expendi-
ture in the federal budget. The main beneficiary of the credit is coalbed
methane, natural gas that is extracted from tight seams in coal mines.
Traditionally this gas was vented to reduce safety problems in mines.
But with higher gas prices, the credit and advances in technology, it has
become economic to recover this gas. This is not a non-conventional fuel
per se but its extraction method might be viewed as non-conventional.Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 161
Section 45 Production Tax Credits
Section 45 of the IRS code, enacted in the Energy Policy Act of 1992,
provided for a production tax credit of 1.5 per kWh (indexed) of elec-
tricity generated from wind and closed-loop biomass systems.28 The
tax credit has been extended and expanded over time and currently is
available for wind, closed-loop biomass, poultry waste, solar, geother-
mal and other renewable sources at a current rate of 1.9per kWh.29
Firms may take the credit for ten years. Refined coal is also eligible for
a section 45 production credit at the current rate of $5.481 per ton.3°
EPACT added new hydropower and Indian coal with the latter receiv-
ing a credit of $1.50 per ton for the first four years and $2.00 per ton for
three additional years. While EPACT extended the section 45 tax credits
for two additional years (through 2007), it did not extend the credit for
solar generated electricity beyond 2005.
Finally, EPACT allowed for the issuance of $800 million in Clean
Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs) to finance projects eligible for sec-
tion 45 production tax credits (with the exception of Indian coal). CREBs
do not pay interest. Rather the holder of a CREB on its credit allowance
date is entitled to a tax credit to be determined by the Treasury Depart-
ment so that the bond may be sold at par.31
Other Production Tax Credits
EPACT provided a production tax credit for electricity produced at
nuclear power plants (section 45J). Qualifying plants are eligible for a
1.8t per kWh production tax credit up to an annual limit of $125 million
per 1,000 megawatts of installed capacity. This limit will be binding for
a nuclear power plant with a capacity factor of 80 percent or higher. The
law places an aggregate limit of 6,000 megawatts of capacity eligible for
this credit.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (PL 108-357) created a pro-
duction credit (section 451) for marginal oil and gas producers of $3.00
per barrel of oil ($.50 per mcf of natural gas) in year 2005 dollars. The
full credit is available when oil (gas) prices fall below $15 per barrel
($1.67 per mcf) and phases out when prices reach $18 per barrel ($2.00
per mcf).32 Marginal wells produce on average 15 or less barrels of oil
(or oil equivalent) per day.
This same law provided for small refinery expensing of 75 percent
of capital costs associated with low sulfur diesel fuel production and
a 5 per gallon small refiner's credit for the remaining 25 percent of
qualified capital costs for the production of low sulfur diesel fuel. The162 Metcalf
2005 Energy Policy Act allowed a pass through of this credit to owners
of cooperatives.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 contained a provi-
sion for a 15 percent credit (section 43) for expenditures on enhanced
oil recovery tangible property and intangible drilling and development
costs and other related capital expenditures. The credit is phased out as
the section 29 reference oil price exceeds $28 in 1990 dollars ($37.44 for
2005). At current prices, producers cannot take this credit.
Section 48 Investment Tax Credits
Nonrefundable investment tax credits for alternative energy were
initially put in place in the Energy Tax Act of 1978 (PL 95-618) at a
rate of 10 percent for solar and geothermal property That law provided
a number of investment tax credits including a credit for residential
energy conservation investments. This latter credit expired in 1982.
EPACT increased the investment tax credit for solar to 30 percent. In
addition the 30 percent tax credit applies to fuel cells used to produce
electricity while the 10 percent credit is available for qualifying micro-
turbine power plants.
The section 48 investment tax credits for renewable energy produc-
tion were extended by EPACT to apply to investments in certain clean
coal facilities. Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plants are
eligible for a 20 percent credit (up to a maximum of $800 million in
credits); other advanced coal-based projects are eligible for a 15 percent
credit (up to a maximum of $500 million in credits); and certified gas-
ification projects are also eligible for a 20 percent credit (maximum of
$350 million in credits). The section 45 and 48 credits combined are the
single largest energy tax expenditure in the federal budget worth $4.1
billion over a five year period.
Section 40 Alcohol and Biodiesel Fuels Credit
The Energy Policy Act of 1978 included an exemption from the motor
fuels excise tax for alcohol and alcohol blended fuels, generically known
as gasohol.33 The Windfall Profits Tax allowed an immediate tax credit
in lieu of the exemption. The credit was set at a rate to be equivalent
to the tax exemption. The alcohol fuel mixture credit is currently $.51
per gallon of ethanol in gasohol and $.60 for other alcohol based fuels
(excluding petroleum based alcohol fuels). In addition small produc-
ers may take a credit of $.10 per gallon. The 2005 Energy Policy Act
increased the small producer production capacity limit from 30 million
to 60 million gallons per year.Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 163
The American Jobs Creation Act also added section 40A of the code to
provide an income tax credit for biodiesel fuels at a rate of $.50 per gal-
lon of bio-diesel (other than agri-biodiesel) and $1.00 for agri-biodiesel.
Like the alcohol fuel tax credit, it is first applied to motor fuel excise tax
payments with the excess added to the general business credit.
6. Other Issues Bearing on Production and Investment Tax Credits
Firms or individuals may not receive the full value of the produc-
tion and investment tax credits (along with other energy related tax
incentives) described above depending on the taxpayer's alternative
minimum tax (AMT) status. All of these credits are part of the general
business credit. Credits included in the general business credit may be
used to the extent that they do not reduce the taxpayer's after-credit
liability below the tentative minimum tax. Note that this limitation may
occur even if the taxpayer pays no alternative minimum tax.35 Accord-
ing to Carison (2005), 70 percent of firms in the mining industry in 2002
were either in a loss or an AMT status and so unable to avail themselves
of many if not all of their tax credits.36 It is unclear how the limitatidn on
the use of credits under the general business credit affects investment.
4.4Tax Incentives for Electric Utilities
Many of the tax incentives that affect the electric utility industry have
to do with accelerated depreciation and are discussed above. EPACT
provided for several additional incentives. First, electric utilities are
allowed to carry back net operating losses (NOLs) for five years (as
opposed to the standard two year carry back) for an NOL occurring in
tax years 2003-2005. The NOL must be used before January 1, 2009 and
the tax refund arising from the use of the NOL is limited in any year
to 20 percent of the utility's prior year investment in electric transmis-
sion equipment rated at 69 kV or higher and specified pollution control
equipment.37
Second, owners of nuclear power plants are required to make contri-
butions to a decommissioning fund for the plant. The Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984 allowed those contributions to be tax deductible at the time
of contribution if those contributions were funded as part of the cost of
service to ratepayers of regulated utilities. The cost of service rules were
repealed in EPACT so that all taxpayers, including unregulated utili-
ties, could deduct their contributions to decommissioning funds.
Finally, EPACT extends a current provision allowing electric utffi-
ties who dispose of certain transmission property to implement FERC
restructuring policy to recognize the gain over an eight year period164 Metcalf
rather than in the current year. Proceeds from the sale must be rein-
vested in other utility property
4.5Transportation
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 allowed a 10 percent credit (up to $4,000)
for the purchase of an electric vehicle. After 2005, the maximum credit
falls to $1,000 and the credit terminates as of the end of 2006. Hybrid
clean-fuel vehicles and other clean-fuel vehicles were allowed a $2,000
deduction. These deductions and credits were replaced by the Alterna-
tive Motor Vehicle Credit (sec. 30B) as enacted in EPACT. Section 30B
of the tax code provides a credit for fuel cell vehicles, alternate fuel
vehicles (natural gas, LNG, LPG, hydrogen, and 85 percent methanol
fuel vehicles), and hybrids. The credit depends on different vehicle
attributes depending on the type of vehicle. Table 5.5 lists the credit
information for different fuel types.
EPACT also replaced a deduction for installing clean-fuel vehicle
refueling property with a 30 percent tax credit for property placed in
service before Jan. 1, 2008.
4.6Energy Efficiency
Prior to the passage of last year's energy legislation, the only remain-
ing tax incentive pertaining to energy conservation was section 136 of
the tax code enacted in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Section 136 pro-
vides an exclusion from gross income of any subsidies provided by an
electric utility for the purchase or installation of any energy conserva-
tion measure. EPACT provided a number of new incentives. First, the
law allows a 30 percent personal income tax credit not to exceed $2,000
for photovoltaic and solar water heating property (excluding equip-
ment for heating swimming pools and hot tubs) installed at residential
Table 5.5




Fuel Type Credit Determining Characteristics8,500 Pounds
Fuel cell Gross vehicle weight, fuel economy$12,000
Hybrids Fuel economy, lifetime fuel savings$3,400
Alternative fuels Gross vehicle weight $4,000
Advanced lean-burn dieselFuel economy, lifetime fuel savings$3,400Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 165
properties. Fuel cell power plants are also eligible for the 30 percent
credit not to exceed$500per0.5kW of capacity Second, the law pro-
vides a 10 percent personal income tax credit for insulation materials,
energy saving windows and doors, and energy conserving metal roofs.
In addition, taxpayers may take a credit for specific energy efficiency
appliances such as advanced main air circulating fans($50),furnace
and hot water boilers($150),and qualifying energy efficient property
(e.g., designated heat pumps and air conditioners) ($300) with a maxi-
mum credit per home of$500no more than $200 of which may be for
windows. Third, contractors may take a tax credit of $1,000 ($2,000) for
new home construction that is certified to obtain a 30 percent(50per-
cent) reduction in energy usage.
Fourth, commercial property energy conservation expenditures are
eligible for a deduction of costs up to $1.80 per square foot if the spend-
ing effects a50percent or more reduction in energy usage. For build-
ings that do not achieve a50percent reduction, a partial allowance is
allowed based on guidelines for specific technologies to be established
by the Secretary of the Treasury. Finally, appliance manufacturers are
provided a production credit for energy-efficient dishwashers, clothes
washers and refrigerators. The maximum credit is $100 for dishwash-
ers, $200 for clothes washers and$175for refrigerators.
5.Incentive and Distributional Effects of Energy Tax Incentives
Who benefits from the various taxes and tax incentives described in
sections 3 and 4? And what are the impacts on energy demand and
supply? In this section, I discuss the incidence and behavioral impacts
of various tax provisions.
5.1Motor Fuels Excise and Gas-Guzzler Taxes
Consider first the incidence impact of the federal excise tax on motor
fuels. Doyle and Samphantharak (2006) find that roughly 80 percent
of increases in state sales taxes on gasoline are passed forward to con-
sumers. This is consistent with other studies and likely underesti-
mates the shifting of federal excise taxes to consumers given state-level
competition.38 Gasoline taxes are generally viewed as regressive. This
view is confirmed by Poterba (1991) when households are ranked by
annual income. But when ranked by current expenditures as a proxy
for lifetime income, Poterba finds that gasoline taxes are much less
regressive.166 Metcalf
Assessing the gas guzzler tax is more difficult. Surprisingly few
studies of the gas guzzler tax have been carried out that take the light
truck loophole into account. Greene et al. (2005) undertake simulations
of a gas-guzzler tax and find that removing the exemption for light
trucks increases mileage for these vehicles as manufacturers cluster
vehicles (both passenger cars and light trucks) just above the miles
per gallon cutoff for the tax. Their study holds all characteristics
other than fuel economy and price constant. Thus, the recent phenom-
enon of using engine improvements to obtain higher power and per-
formance at the expense of fuel efficiency cannot be modeled in their
analysis.
5.2Oil and Natural Gas Production Incentives
Turning to production and investment tax incentives, consider first oil
and natural gas production. The favorable treatment accorded oil pro-
ducers and refiners lowers the cost of oil and could affect prices of final
petroleum products. But since oil is priced in world markets and to a
great extent is a homogenous product, it is not clear that the domestic
tax incentives would have a large impact on the price of gasoline or
other petroleum products.39 In this case, the benefits largely accrue to
producers in the form of higher wages for specialized workers in oil
production and refining and higher dividends to shareholders.
It may be, however, that the U.S. supply incentives have an impact
on worldwide supply and price given the magnitude of U.S. oil pro-
duction. As noted in endnote 5, the United States is the third largest
producer of oil with 8.5 percent of the world's production in 2004. A
simple rough calculation suggests however that the U.S. supply incen-
tives are unlikely to have a large impact on world oil prices or supply.
Let Q be the world supply of oil, and Q3 the U.S. supply (with analo-
gous variables defined for oil demand). Also let p andbe the price
received by U.S. oil suppliers and oil suppliers in the rest of the world,
respectively. Finally, let PD== p5 - s be the worldwidedemand price
and s the subsidy arising from tax incentives provided to domestic oil
suppliers. Setting world oil supply equal to demand and differentiat-
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where i7andare the demand and supply elasticities for oil. Long-
run estimates of these elasticities are in the neighborhood of -0.5 and
0.5 respectively.40 The percentage change in worldwide oil supply is
then
The tax incentives for oil (percentage depletion and expensing of IDCs)
are most valuable for small producers. Taking the oil industry as a
group, let us say that the value of the subsidies is worth 10 percent of
the current price of oil.4' Table 5.6 shows the impact on world oil pro-
duction for various demand and supply elasticities:
Table 5.6
Percentage Change in World Oil Supply
Supply elasticity
Change arising from a subsidy to domestic production equal to 10 percent of oil price.
The supply response ranges from zero to 0.3 percent with 0.2 percent
the response associated with the central parameter value assumptions.
Table 5.7 shows that the price response is also small:
Table 5.7
Percentage Change in World Oil Price
Supply elasticity
Demand Elasticity
-0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7
0_i 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
0.3 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
0.5 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
0.7 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3%
Demand Elasticity
-0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7
0.1 -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1%
0.3 -0.6% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3%
0.5 -0.7% -0.5% -0.4% -0.4%
0.7 -0.7% -0.6% -0.5% -0.4%
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The price decline ranges from 0.1 percent to 0.7 percent with a central
parameter response of 0.4 percent.
To some extent, a similar story can be told for natural gas. Natural gas
is not as easily transportable as oil and regional price differences can
persist over time. Improvements in transportation and the increase in
LNG shipping, however, are breaking down these regional barriers.
This analysis is consistent with a recent analysis of a precursor bill
to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 done by the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2004). This report reviewed section 29 and 45 tax cred-
its along with other production incentive tax provisions and concluded
that with the exception of the section 29 credits, the provisions did little
to increase domestic production of gas or oil. Section 29 credits would
increase domestic natural gas from non-conventional sources (coalbed
methane for the most part). Ultimately, domestic consumption would
be unaffected by these provisions.
Recall the discussion of national security as a rationale for an energy
tax policy. The analysis in this section suggests that the production and
investment tax credits embodied in current law wifi have little effect
on world production or on efforts to stabilize domestic energy prices.
Where a policy to encourage domestic production of energy may be
effective is to increase the proportion of energy that is not subject to
supply disruptions due to political upheaval. But here the rationale
is a bit murky. Many of the tax incentives encourage the production
of electricity from nuclear or renewable sources. But currently only
3 percent of oil is used for electricity production. It may well be that
concerns about natural gas disruptions motivate these policies (natu-
ral gas accounts for 24 percent of electricity production). Natural gas
however is more subject to price spikes arising from bottlenecks in pro-
duction and distribution than from political shocks. A concern with oil
supply disruptions would suggest a focus on reducing petroleum use
in transportation, currently responsible for two-thirds of all petroleum
consumption.
5.3Electric Generation from Alternative and Renewable Fuels
The production and investment credits for renewable and alternative
fuels can have a large impact on whether various electric generation
technologies are cost competitive in the marketplace. With the shift
from regulated utilities to an environment in which electricity genera-
tion is increasingly unregulated, cost considerations become increas-
ingly important for firms contemplating constructing merchant powerFederal Tax Policy towards Energy 169
plants. In this section, I present estimates of the levelized cost for dif-
ferent sources of electricity under varying assumptions about the avail-
ability of federal tax incentives.
The levelized cost analysis is similar in spirit to the Hall-Jorgenson
cost of capital framework. It asks what price must be received for elec-
tricity sold by a generator to cover fixed and variable costs of providing
the electricity including the required return for equity owners.43 This
approach has been used in a variety of studies of electric power genera-
tion (e.g., Deutch and Moniz 2003; Tolley and Jones 2004; and Sekar et
al. 2005). The steps to constructing an estimate of levelized cost are:
Compute the present discounted value of costs in each year over
life of a project. This includes all capital and operating costs net of tax
deductions.
Sum all costs over life of project. This is the present discounted value
of the project's overall costs.
Compute the amount of constant real before-tax revenue required
each year that will equal the total present discounted value of costs
over the life of the project.
Divide this required revenue value by total kilowatt-hours produced
by plant to obtain a cost per kWh.
I estimate the levelized cost for the following eight electricity genera-
tion sources: nuclear, conventional (pulverized) coal, clean coal using
an integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) process, natural gas
combined cycle, biomass, wind, solar thermal and photovoltaics. The
first three technologies are generally used as baseload generators and
the latter are either shoulder or peaking generators.
Table 5.8 provides key parameter value choices for the eight different
technologies. The capacity factor describes what fraction of the time a
plant is operating. Nuclear power plants are designed to operate con-
tinuously but are shut down for routine and unexpected maintenance.
The capacity factor for nuclear power is taken from Deutch and Moniz
(2003). I've chosen capacity factors for coal and natural gas to be com-
parable to nuclear. The capacity factors for the renewable resources are
for the most part taken from the Energy Information Administration's
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).45
The overnight cost is the total capital construction cost of the plant
in year 2004 dollars. Construction costs are covered with short-term
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































%Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 171
bonds are issued and equity financing raised to cover those costs. I've
assumed 60 percent debt financing on all projects except nuclear. I
assume a lower debt financing rate of 50 percent toacknowledge the
greater perceived risk of nuclear financing in themarketplace. The
economic life of these assets varies and they have a MACRS recovery
period of five to 15 years. Finally, I assume that the Section 45J produc-
tion tax credit for nuclear power hits the $125 million cap per 1,000 MW
of capacity. See the Appendix for more details on the computation of
levelized costs.
Table 5.9 reports levelized costs of electricity in cents per kWh (year
2004 dollars). I assume that the plant will be placed in serviceafter Jan.
1, 2006 so that solar power is not eligible for a production taxcredit but
does obtain the more generous 30 percent section 48 investment tax
credit.46 The first column provides the levelized cost under current law.
Coal has the lowest levelized cost with the cost of IGCC comparable to
that of a conventional pulverized coal plant given the new investment
tax incentive for IGCC enacted in EPACT. Nuclear andnatural gas are
the next most expensive followed by biomass and wind.47 Eitherof the
solar generating plants are considerably more expensive than other
electricity sources with photovoltaics (PV) over four times the cost of
natural gas. Note that wind and solar are intermittent power sources
and so require stand-by generation. A recent study by The Royal Acad-
emy of Engineering (2004) found thatthe requirement for stand-by
power raised the cost of onshore wind powerby nearly 50 percent. I
have not factored such costs into this analysis.
Comparing the first two columns, eliminating the section 45 produc-
tion tax credit only modestly raises the cost of biomass and wind (4
percent cost increase) but raises the cost of nuclear by nearly30 percent.
Next, eliminating the section 48 investment tax credits raises the cost of
the IGCC plant by 15 percent and the cost of solar by over 35 percent.
Column 4 reports levelized costs assuming the various production
and investment tax credits but replacing the accelerated depreciation
with economic depreciation (modeled as straight-line depreciation)
over the asset's life.48 Accelerated depreciation is most generousto
wind and solar generated electricity. Replacing accelerated deprecia-
tion with economic depreciation would raise the cost of wind andsolar
thermal by 13 percent and PV by 15 percent. For the other fuel sources,
replacing accelerated depreciation with economic depreciationwould
raise the cost of nuclear by 9 percent, biomass by 8 percent,coal by 7




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 173
Column 5 reports levelized costs assuming a tax system that provides
a level playing field. This scenario assumes economic depreciationand
no production or investment tax credits. In terms ofthe impact on 1ev-
elized cost, conventional coal and natural gas receive the fewest tax
preferences. Leveling the playing field raises the cost of biomass by 11
percent with the bulk of the benefit arising from accelerated deprecia-
tion (based on a comparison of columns 2 through 4 with 5). The cost
of wind is higher by 16 percent with the majority of the benefit arising
from accelerated depreciation. The cost of IGCC is higher by 23 percent
with roughly two-thirds of the benefit arising from the investment tax
credit. The cost of nuclear is higher by 38 percent with the production
tax credit providing the bulk of the benefits. Finally, the cost of solar is
over 50 to 60 percent higher with about two-thirds of the benefit arising
from the production tax credits.
In the final column, I compute levelized costs assuming zero taxes.
While the levelized cost of most technologies falls, the cost of nuclear
and solar rises indicating that these technologies face a negative effec-
tive average tax rate. Eliminating taxes raises the cost of nuclear by 6
percent and solar by 13 to 16 percent.
From a social welfare perspective, the production and investment
tax credits are costly ways to encourage renewable electricity genera-
tion since the subsidies must be financed by raising distortionary taxes.
An alternative approach to encouraging renewable electricity genera-
tion would be to place a tax on traditional fuels.49 As a final calcula-
tion, I computed the levelized cost of biomass and wind assuming no
investment or production tax credits. In this case, the levelized costs
of biomass and wind are 5.56 and 5.91j per kWh respectively. A tax
on carbon dioxide of $12 per metric ton would raise the price of natu-
ral gas sufficiently to make biomass and wind cost-competitive with
natural gas. Unlike the subsidies, however, the tax would raise revenue
which could finance reductions in other distortionary taxes.5° In units
perhaps more familiar to most readers, a carbon tax of this magnitude
would raise the price of gasoline by ten cents if it were fully passed
forward to consumers.
Summing up, relative to a world with no taxes the current tax code
provides net subsidies to nuclear and solar power. Relative to a tax sys-
tem with a level playing field, conventional technologies receive very
modest subsidies while subsidies for nuclear and clean coal are sub-
stantial and the subsidies for solar very substantial. The subsidies are
most effective (in the sense of making electricity competitive from this174 Metcalf
source) for IGCC plants which become competitive with conventional
coal and for biomass and wind which become competitive with natural
gas.
5.4Energy Efficiency
The energy efficiency incentives contained in EPACT are similar
in many ways to energy tax credits contained in the Energy Tax Act
of 1978, including a 15 percent tax credit (up to $300) for residential
energy conservation improvements. Analyzing a panel of federal tax
returns between 1979 and 1985 when the residential conservation credit
expired, Hassett and Metcalf (1995) found that the credit significantly
raised the probability of a household installing energy conservation
capital in their home. Somewhat surprisingly, the authors found that
the credit was much more successful at raising investment levels than a
comparable energy price increase. They speculated that the credit pro-
gram may have publicity effects that spur investment that the energy
price increase does not have. The study was not able to determine to
what extent credit takers were inframarginal investorsthat is home-
owners who would have made conservation investments in the absence
of the tax credit.51
6.Conclusion
Tax incentives are a major part of the federal government's energy tax
policy and increasingly so with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of
2005. A number of points emerge from this analysis. First, the focus of
energy incentives contained in the tax code has shifted over the years
from focusing almost entirely on traditional fossil fuel production to
an increasing emphasis on alternative and renewable technologies.
Second, those incentives are difficult to rationalize on the basis of eco-
nomic efficiency or distributional goals. Production and investment tax
credits, in particular, may be very costly ways to encourage the devel-
opment of renewable energy technology.
Third, incentives for the oil and natural gas industry are unlikely to
have an appreciable impact on world energy prices despite the United
States being the third largest oil producer in the world (and second
largest natural gas producer). Fourth, current tax incentives are mak-
ing wind and biomass cost competitive with natural gas electricity pro-
duction. The 20 percent investment tax credit for IGCC in EPACT is
likely to make this technology cost competitive with conventional coalFederal Tax Policy towards Energy 175
generated electricity Solar generated electricity continues to be very
expensive.
Fifth, the limited evidence suggests that the energy efficiency incen-
tives enacted by EPACT should increase conservation investment activ-
ity It is difficult to say, however, how much of this investment will be
new investment as opposed to investmentthat would have taken place
in the absence of the incentive programs. To the extent that inframar-
ginal investment is a significant fraction of total investment, the cost-
effectiveness of this incentive is driven down. But of course this is true
for all of the energy incentives described in this paper and suggests the
importance of further research on the behavioral impacts of energy tax
incentives.
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tufts.edu.
The list is naturally incomplete given the complexity of the tax code. In particular I do
not focus on how the tax treatment of foreign income earned by multinational corpora-
tions bears on energy production. This is potentially a major issue. For example, prior
to the nationalization of oil production in the major oil producing countries, the major
U.S. oil producers paid taxes to host countries that were termed income taxes but were
in reality excise taxes. Standard tax treatment would provide for a deduction on the U.S.
corporate income tax for those foreign tax payments. Instead, the U.S. companies were
allowed a foreign tax credit for the "income" taxes paid to host countries, a preference
lobbied for byamong othersthe State Department. See Adelman (1995), pp. 50-55 for
more on this point.
See Feng et al. (2005) for a discussion and evaluation of feasible alternatives to direct
emission taxes for motor vehicles.
Two-thirds of petroleum is used in the transportation sector (U.S. Energy Information
Administration 2005).
Partial policies can raise the cost of carbon emission reductions considerably. Pizer et
al. (2006) present model results showing that focusing climate change policies only on the
transportation and electricity sectors doubles the cost of a given carbon emissions reduc-
tion. Note too that the motor vehicle fuels tax is sometimes justified as a use charge for
highways. To the extent this is true, the motor vehicle fuels tax is even less effective as a
proxy tax for externalities.
That the source of the oil the United States consumes is irrelevant for oil price stability
should be made clear by the fact that the United States is the third largest oil producer in176 Metcalf
the world, with production only exceeded by the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.
The United States produced 8.5 percent of the world's oil in 2004. It is also the second
largest producer of natural gas after the Russian Federation with a world production
share of 19 percent. See BP (2006) for data.
Karp and Newbery (1991) provide a more sophisticated analysis to resolve a dynamic
inconsistency problem with simple oil tariff expropriation stories. But the basic result
holds.
The tax was most recently raised to 18.3't per gallon for gasoline on Oct. 1, 1993. See
Jackson (2006) for a history of changes to this tax.
In fiscal year 2004, the UK collected £832 million in its Climate Change Levy, approxi-
mately £1,614 million in VAT on energy related sales, and £22,786 in its hydrocarbons tax.
Data are from excise tax sheets published by HM Revenue & Customs and available at
hap:! /www.uktradeinfo.com.
The mileage rating is calculated approximately as 55 percent of the EPA city mileage
rating and 45 percent of the highway rating.
I have not included tax expenditures associated with transportation (e.g., exclusion
from income for employer reimbursed parking). Nor do I consider state or local energy
tax incentives in this paper.
As GAO points out, one cannot simply add tax expenditures given the interactions
among different provisions of the tax code. But the summation indicates the relative
importance of the provisions when making comparisons across time.
It is unclear whether this tax expenditure has any incentive effect now that ethanol
use is mandated in motor fuels by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.1 thank John McLelland
for pointing this out.
This brief description draws on an excellent overview by Lazzari (2006).
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (PL108-357) provided a major expansion of
the production tax credits.
The production tax credit for wind and biomass briefly expired in 2003. According to
the American Wind Energy Association, wind power capacity additions fell from 1,687
MW in 2003 to 389 MW following the temporary lapse of this tax provision.
In general I do not discuss energy tax incentives that have expired. See Edwards et al.
(1998) for some discussion of energy tax incentives related to global warming that existed
prior to 1998. Diis includes the major incentives that have expired. I also generally do not
provide information about sunset provisions for the various incentives since historically
sunset dates have been extended for most energy-related tax incentives.
The recovery period is the number of years over which an asset may be depreciated
for tax purposes. Certain assets must be depreciated under the Alternative Depreciation
System (ADS). See U.S. Internal Revenue Service (2006) for more information.
Exploratory wells continue to have high failure rates. In 2003, 55 percent of explor-
atory wells were dry holes and 9 percent of development wells were dry holes. But less
than 2,700 exploratory wells were drilled that year compared to over 32,200 development
wells. Roughly the same number of development wells were drified in 1960 but with a
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percent of them being dry holes. See tables 4.5-4.7 in U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (2005).
The caps for 2005 were $2,960 in the first year, $4,700 in the second year, $2,850 in
the third year, and $1,675 in subsequent years for passenger cars. For light trucks weigh-
ing less than 6,000 pounds (including minivans, SUVs, and pickup trucks) the limits are
$3,260 in the first year, $5,200 in the second year, $3,150 in the third year, and $1,875 in
subsequent years.
Independent producers are defined as producers who do not engage in refining or
retail operations. EPACT increased the amount of oil a company could refine before it
was deemed to engage in refining for this purpose from 50,000 to 75,000 barrels per day.
Amounts in excess of the 65 percent rule can be carried forward to subsequent tax
years. The net income limitation has been suspended in years past but the suspension
lapsed as of this year.
This example presumes that the net income from the first year's operation exceeds
$94,500. If not, the deduction would be reduced accordingly. For purposes of computing
the net income limitation, costs are computed without any depletion deduction consid-
ered.
EPACT set the recovery period at two years but the Tax Increase Prevention and Rec-
onciliation Act of 2005 (PL 109-222) extended the period to five years for the major inte-
grated oil companies.
Section 29 is relabeled as section 45K by EPACT.
For an overview and analysis of the Windfall Profit Tax, see Lazzari (1990).
Most energy tax credits were part of the general business credit. Prior to EPACT, the
section 29 credits were an exception and so any unused credits were lost. As part of the
general business credit, excess credits can be carried backward one year and forward 20
years.
The reference price for oil in 2005 was $50.26 and so the full credit could be taken. The
credit amount and reference price are published annually in the Federal Register. With
the reference oil price currently at $62.51 (April 2006 crude oil domestic first purchase
price), it is unlikely that firms will be able to take the full section 29 credit in 2006.
A closed-loop biomass is plant material grown specifically for use in a biomass gen-
erator.
Open-loop biomass is eligible for a 0.75in 1992 dollars per kWh.
Refined coal is a synthetic fuel produced from coal with lower emissions of certain
pollutants.
State and local tax exempt financing is also available for qualified energy facilities.
These bonds are subject to a state's private-activity volume cap.
The section 29 reference price is used to determine eligibility for this credit.
Originally, the law provided a full exemption from the then $.04 per gallon tax. As
the motor fuels excise tax was raised over time, the exemption did not keep pace with the
excise tax rate. See General Accounting Office (1997) for an early chronology of events
related to this tax exemption.178 Metcalf
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 subsequently eliminated the tax exemption
in favor of the tax credit.
This would occur if the taxpayer's regular tax liability after foreign tax credits but
before other tax credits exceeded the tentative minimum tax but its regular tax liability
after tax credits was less than the tentative minimum tax. Foreign tax credits are included
in the tentative minimum tax and thus not subject to AMT limitations.
In addition to the AMT's impact on tax credits, the AMT treats mining exploration
and development costs, depletion including percentage depletion (unless an indepen-
dent producer) and intangible drilling costs as AMT preferences.
The equipment need not be placed in service in that year.
Doyle and Samphanthark report other studies showing complete forward shifting of
federal motor fuel taxes.
Oil differs in its transportation costs as well as product characteristics (sulfur content,
viscosity, etc.) In the long run, however, these cost and characteristic differences have
little impact on the final product costs.
Cooper (2003) reviews estimates of the long run demand elasticity and Greene et al.
(1998) reviews long run demand and supply elasticities.
This is a high estimate. The GAO estimates for FY2003 tax preferences for the sec-
tion 29 and enhanced oil recovery credits, the excess of percentage over cost depletion,
expensing of IDCs, and the rules on passive loss limitations equal just over 2 percent of
the value of domestic crude oil and natural gas production in that year.
Natural gas imports as a percentage of total U.S. consumption have risen from 4.7
percent in 1980 to 15.3 percent in 2004 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2005).
The price is a constant real price received over the life of the plant to cover lifetime
fixed and variable costs.
See Appendix A for a complete listing of parameter values and additional detail
about the calculations. These parameter values should be viewed with some caution. A
degree of uncertainty underlies many of the values. The overnight cost for nuclear power,
for example, is highly uncertain given the limited recent experience with construction in
the United States and the uncertainties of the regulatory process.
I have not adjusted the wind and solar capacity factors to account for the intermit-
tency of these power sources.
I have not assumed any limitations on credits from the Alternative Minimum Tax in
table 5.8.
Given the cost differential between coal and nuclear, the current interest in nuclear
power reflects in part a bet that a U.S. carbon policy will eventually raise the cost of coal
power plants.
I've also modeled economic depreciation for the assets according to the depreciation
rates estimated by Fraumeni (1997) in a modified one-hoss-shay model. I assume geomet-
ric depreciation using Fraumeni's rates over the life of the asset with all remaining basis
depreciated in the final year. The levelized costs under this approach are very similar to
those calculated when economic depreciation is modeled as straight-line.Federal Tax Policy towards Energy 179
One could also impose renewable portfolio standards as many states have done.
Palmer and Burtraw (2005) argue that portfolio standards are more cost effective at
achieving given renewable shares in electricity generation than production tax credits
given the social cost of raising revenue to finance the subsidies. Note too the different
incidence of production tax credits and renewable portfolio standards. The former are
borne by taxpayers while the latter are borne by electricity consumers in the form of
higher electricity prices.
Metcalf (2005) discusses how a carbon tax could be used to finance corporate tax
integration. The advantage of taxes over subsidies for clean power extends beyond the
distortionary cost of financing the subsidies. The subsidies lower the cost of electricity
and so encourage increased consumption.
In the energy conservation literature, this is referred to as free-riding. See Metcalf
(2006) for a discussion of behavioral responses to energy conservation initiatives and the
difficulty in assessing the cost-effectiveness of these programs.
Many renewable plants are built at considerably smaller capacity. The cost assump-
tions used here are based on a plant of optimal size. My approach follows that of Sekar,
et al. (2005).
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Appendix.Calculating the Levelized Cost of Electric Power
Generating Plants
The levelized cost of an electricity generating power plant is the price per
k\'Vh that the plant must receive for electricity sold that will cover all costs of
production including a return to equity holders. I construct levelized costs for
various technologies for a hypothetical power plant with a 1,000 MW capac-
ity.2 Table 5.A1 provides a full list of the plant-specific parameters used in the
analysis.
In addition, I assumed an inflation rate of 3 percent, a combined federal and
state tax rate of 40 percent, a nominal bond return of 8 percent and a nominal
return to equity of 15 percent.
Most plant-specific parameter values are taken from the U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration (2006) Annual Energy Outlook (AEO). Fuel costs are
based on projected fuel costs from the AEO which assumes real growth in fuel
prices over the 40 year expected life of all power plants. The debt-equity ratio
for nuclear and coal is based on assumptions in Deutch and Moniz (2003) and
I assume the same ratio for renewables as for coal. Periodic capital spending is
required for all technologies for capital additions and upgrades. AEO assumes
increased capital upgrade spending in the last ten years of the plant's life. For
simplicity I treat these expenditures as operating expenditures rather than capi-
talize them over the remaining life of the plant. The economic life of the various
plants is taken from The Royal Academy of Engineering (2004). I also use this
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The steps required for this calculation are:
Compute the present discounted value of costs in each year over life of a
project. This includes all capital and operating costs net of tax deductions.
Sum all costs over life of project. This is the present discounted value of the
project's costs.
Compute the amount of constant real before-tax revenue required each year
that will equal the total present discounted value of costs over the life of the
project.
Divide this required revenue value by total kilowatt-hours produced by
plant to obtain a cost per kWh.
Construction time differs across the technologies. I assume construction costs
follow a sinusoidal pattern (increasing, peaking and then declining) over the
time period with plant construction beginning in 2005. To illustrate how con-
struction costs are handled, consider a nuclear power plant built over six years.
Table 5.A2 provides the data for an overnight cost of $2,014 per kW.
The overnight cost for the plant is distributed over the six year construc-
tion period with construction costs peaking mid-way through the construc-
tion period. Spending is converted to nominal dollars using the last year of
construction as the base year. Nominal cash flows are discounted using the
firm's discount rate (column 3). These discounted numbers enter the sum-
mation in step 2. Once the plant begins operation fixed and operating costs
(including fuel costs, maintenance, nuclear decommissioning costs, capital
increments, bond interest payments and taxes) are summed and then dis-
counted to year zero values. Depreciation and bond interest costs are allowed
as a tax deduction and so reduce the costs by the value of the tax shield (tax rate
times deduction).
The sum of the present discounted costs is converted to a real levelized cost
that is a constant real annual payment by the firm to cover all costs. For the
nuclear power plant, the constant real annual before-tax revenue required to
Table 5.A2
Construction Costs for Nuclear Power Plant
Year Real Nominal Discounted
1 135 116 203
2 369 327 511
3 503 461 643
4 503 475 593
5 369 358 400
6 135 135 135
Total 2014 1872 2484184 Metcalf
match the sum of the present discounted costs (including the value of the tax
shields) over the life of the plant is $321 million per year.
Finally in step 4 this is converted to a cost per kWh. Total annual production
for the plant is the number of hours in the year times its capacity factor. Divid-
ing this into the annual levelized cost yields a cost per kWh. Based on a capacity
factor of 85 percent, the anìnual $321 million cost translates to a real levelized
cost of 4.31q per kWh.